Talking Points
Some useful talking points summarizing the heart of the realist case against nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are virtually useless as weapons, Part I
If you use nuclear weapons on the battlefield you're almost sure to kill some of your own soldiers. Nuclear weapons not only create large explosions, they release poison--radiation--that persists at the site of the explosion and is also carried downwind. So if you use nuclear weapons against your adversary's forces on the battlefield, if the wind changes direction the radiation could easily blow back on your own troops. on a nuclear battlefield, you either have to put military operations on hold while you wipe and clean or accept that some of your soldiers (and possibly quite a lot of your soldiers) will die from radiation.
Nuclear weapons are virtually useless as weapons, Part II
It is absolutely true that nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever. But that doesn't make them militarily useful. Wars are won by killing your adversary's soldiers, not by killing bystanders. In the shootout at the OK corral, the side that won wasn't the side that killed the most bystanders. The side that won was the one that killed the most gunslingers. No war has ever been won by killing civilians or bombing cities. Not in the ancient world, not in the Medieval world, not in the modern world. Not Carthage, not Liege, not Magdeburg, not Urganch, not Chunking, not Guernica, not Rotterdam, not Coventry, not Hamburg, not Stalingrad, not Dresden, not Tokyo, not Pyongyang, not Hanoi. What nuclear weapons do best is kill civilians. Unfortunately that is genocide, not winning wars.
Hiroshima
Recent historical research in archives in Russia, the United States, and Japan has made it clear that Japan's leaders decided to surrender because the Soviet Union (which had been neutral) joined the war. Further reading.
Nuclear deterrence has failed in the past
Nuclear believers sometimes claim that nuclear deterrence has never failed. But that can't be right. If nuclear deterrence has never failed, why did the Soviets blockade Berlin in 1948, even though the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons? If nuclear deterrence has never failed, how did the Chinese come into the Korean War on the side of the North Korean in 1950? If nuclear deterrence has never failed, how did President Kennedy decide to run the risk of nuclear war over the Cuban Missile Crisis? If nuclear deterrence has never failed, how could the Egyptians and Syrians have started the Middle East War of 1973, despite the fact that Israel had nuclear weapons? If nuclear deterrence has never failed, how did the Argentines invade the Falkland Islands in 1982? And so on.
Nuclear deterrence must be perfect
The problem with nuclear deterrence is that any failure could be catastrophic. Any failure of deterrence could lead to all out nuclear war, and any nuclear war will almost inevitably become an all-out war in which thousands of nuclear weapons are used, some 400 million people are killed, vast stretches of the Northern Hemisphere are laid waste, and civilization is wrecked for centuries to come. Such an outcome in unacceptable. If even the smallest chance exists that nuclear deterrence could lead to such a catastrophic war, then we simply can't rely on nuclear deterrence. Unless nuclear deterrence can be perfect, it cannot be safe.
Nuclear deterrence will fail
Nuclear deterrence cannot be perfect. The problem is not the machines or the systems, the problem is the human beings. Human beings are fallible. All of us, from the lowliest soldier to the highest leader, we all make mistakes. We all lose our tempers, we all get carried away. We are all vulnerable to madness. And human beings are involved in nuclear deterrence. Human beings make the threats, human beings on the other side evaluate those threats, and human beings decide how to respond. Nuclear deterrence is not some sort of magical machine that sits quietly in the corner running entirely on its own. We are involved at every step.
If human beings are fallible (and we are), and if human beings are involved in nuclear deterrence, then — by definition — nuclear deterrence is inherently flawed. It will fail. It's not a question of if, it's just a question of when.
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